Abstract-We examine the separability of the parallel multiple access wiretap channel. Separability, when exists, is useful as it enables us to code separately over parallel channels, and still achieve the optimum overall performance. It is well-known that the parallel single-user channel, parallel multiple access channel (MAC) and parallel broadcast channel (BC) are all separable, however, the parallel interference channel (IC) is not separable in general. In this paper, we show that, while MAC is separable MAC wiretap channel is not separable in general. We prove this via a specific linear deterministic MAC wiretap channel. We then show that even the Gaussian MAC wiretap channel is inseparable in general. Finally, we show that, when the channel gains are drawn from continuous distributions, and when the secure degrees of freedom (s.d.o.f.) region is considered, then the Gaussian MAC wiretap channel is almost surely separable.
I. INTRODUCTION
Separability, when exists, is useful as it enables us to code separately over parallel channels, and still achieve the optimum overall performance. It is well-known that the parallel singleuser channel [1] , parallel multiple access channel (MAC) [2] and parallel broadcast channel (BC) [3] are all separable, however, the parallel interference channel (IC) is not separable in general [4] - [7] . In particular, reference [4] studied the twouser one-sided ergodic fading IC and showed that separation can be strictly sub-optimal in certain cases. Reference [5] studied the separability in a parallel Gaussian IC, and showed that the parallel Gaussian IC is not always separable by presenting a specific example where joint encoding over the parallel channels outperforms individually optimal encoding in each parallel channel. Reference [6] further confirmed the inseparability of the parallel IC by examining the topological interference channel where the parallel channels correspond to different network topologies some of which had asymmetric connectivity. Recently, reference [7] showed that even symmetric parallel ICs are inseparable by characterizing the capacity region of parallel symmetric linear deterministic ICs.
In this paper, we consider the MAC wiretap channel, which is a combination of a MAC to the legitimate receiver and a MAC to the eavesdropper. The MAC wiretap channel was introduced in [8] , [9] and studied further in [10] - [16] . Even though, in the absence of any secrecy constraints, MAC is the most well-understood multi-user channel model [1] , its wiretap version is significantly more complex. The secrecy capacity This work was supported by NSF Grants CNS 09-64632, CCF 09-64645, CCF 10-18185 and CNS 11-47811. region of the MAC wiretap channel is still unknown today, and its secure degrees of freedom (s.d.o.f.) region has been fully characterized only recently [17] , [18] . In this paper, we focus on the separability of the parallel MAC wiretap channel and show that it is not separable in general. Intuitively, this can be attributed to the observation that, even though MAC wiretap channel is composed of MAC legitimate and eavesdropping links, as a whole, it resembles the IC more, as it has two independent transmitters and two independent receivers.
To show the inseparability of the parallel MAC wiretap channel, we construct a specific linear deterministic MAC wiretap channel in each component channel. We find the exact secrecy capacity of each of these component MAC wiretap channels, and then determine the optimum secrecy rates achievable by separate encoding. This step is challenging as the secrecy capacity of MAC wiretap channels is unknown in general; we provide a specific achievability and converse for the capacity of each of the component channels. We then provide an encoding scheme that codes over the parallel channels which outperforms the optimum separable scheme.
Next, we consider the parallel Gaussian MAC wiretap channel. Since the secrecy capacity region of the general MAC wiretap channel, including the Gaussian MAC wiretap channel, is unknown but exact s.d.o.f. region is known [17] , [18] , we investigate the sum s.d.o.f. of parallel Gaussian MAC wiretap channels and prove that it is inseparable. This implies the inseparability of the secrecy region as well. Next, we observe that, if the different channel gains which give rise to different parallel channels are drawn independently from continuous distributions, then the channel gain configurations which give rise to inseparability fall into a set with zero Lebesgue measure. To confirm this observation, and prove the almost sure s.d.o.f. separability of parallel Gaussian MAC wiretap channels, we consider the flat channel, where we put the individual n channel uses of each component channel into a single 2n channel uses. We utilize the converse techniques in [17] , [18] to show the separability in this case.
Finally, we note that, while inseparability in s.d.o.f. implies inseparability in the secrecy capacity, separability in s.d.o.f. does not imply separability in secrecy capacities. The almost sure separability proved for the parallel Gaussian MAC wiretap channel in this paper holds only for the s.d.o.f., which is the pre-log factor of the secrecy capacity, and is a weaker measure of separability.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND DEFINITIONS
In a two-user MAC wiretap channel p(y 1 , y 2 |x 1 , x 2 ), each transmitter i, i = 1, 2, has a message W i intended for the legitimate receiver whose channel output is Y 1 . For each i, message W i is uniformly and independently chosen from set W i . The rate of message i is
, where the nlength vector X n i denotes the ith user's channel input in n channel uses. All messages are needed to be kept secret from the eavesdropper whose channel output is Y 2 .
A secrecy rate pair (R 1 , R 2 ) is said to be achievable if for any > 0 there exist n-length codes such that the legitimate receiver can decode the messages reliably, i.e., the probability of decoding error is less than
and the messages are kept information-theoretically secure against the eavesdropper
whereŴ 1 ,Ŵ 2 are the estimates of the messages based on the legitimate receiver's observation Y n 1 . The secrecy capacity region C is the closure of the set containing all achievable secrecy rate pairs. The sum secrecy capacity is C Σ = sup(R 1 + R 2 ), where the supremum is over all achievable secrecy rate pairs (R 1 , R 2 ) ∈ C. For Gaussian MAC wiretap channel with average power constraint P for both transmitters, the s.d.o.f. region is defined as:
and the sum s.d.o.f. is defined as:
Let p(y 1a , y 2a |x 1a , x 2a ) and p(y 1b , y 2b |x 1b , x 2b ) be two two-user MAC wiretap channels. The parallel two-user MAC wiretap channel is a two-user MAC wiretap channel in which the channel inputs of transmitter 1 and 2 are (x 1a , x 1b ) and (x 2a , x 2b ), respectively, and the channel inputs are sent simultaneously in parallel. The channel outputs of the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper are (y 1a , y 1b ) and (y 2a , y 2b ), respectively, and are distributed according to
We refer to each MAC wiretap channel, p(y 1a , y 2a |x 1a , x 2a ) and p(y 1b , y 2b |x 1b , x 2b ), as a component channel of the overall parallel MAC wiretap channel.
III. INSEPARABILITY OF THE MAC WIRETAP CHANNEL
In this section, we show that the parallel MAC wiretap channel is not separable in general. To this end, we provide a specific counter example. Consider the linear deterministic parallel discrete memoryless MAC wiretap channel shown in Fig. 1 , which has three component channels: (a), (b) and (c). In the first component channel, (a), transmitter 1 has two sub-channel inputs, i.e., (X 11 , X 12 ), and transmitter 2 has only one sub-channel input X 2 . The legitimate receiver observes (Y 11 , Y 12 ) and the eavesdropper observes Y 2 . In the second component channel, (b), the roles of the two transmitters are swapped. In the third component channel, (c), the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper have identical observations. Specifically, the input/output relationships for sub-channel (a) are:
where all symbols are binary, and addition is modulo-2. While transmitters send independent data, they can each code their data jointly across their parallel channels. In the following two sub-sections, we show that the optimum separable (i.e., independent) coding yields 2 bits/channel-use for the sum secrecy rate, while through coding jointly across the component channels a sum secrecy rate of 3 bits/channel-use is achievable, and hence separation is strictly sub-optimal.
A. Optimum Sum Secrecy Rate with Separable Encoding
Due to independent coding across the component channels:
where C Σ,(a) = C Σ,(b) is due to symmetry, and C Σ,(c) = 0 is due to the fact that the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper have identical observations. Therefore, we only need to show C Σ,(a) = 1 in order to show C Σ,indep = 2. The achievability of 2014 IEEE International Symposium on Information Theory this follows by the following signalling: The first user sends a 1 bit (uniform) information signal in X 12 , and sends no signal in the other sub-channel which leaks to the eavesdropper, i.e., X 11 = 0, and the second user does not send any information, i.e., X 2 = 0. This gives 1 bit secure rate for the first user, and hence 1 bit sum secrecy rate for the system, i.e., C Σ,(a) ≥ 1. Next, we need to prove that the sum secrecy rate in the component channel (a) is upper bounded by 1, i.e., C Σ,(a) ≤ 1.
For convenience, let us denote nR Σ = n(R 1 + R 2 ) − n in order not to carry +n throughout the derivation. Then, by definition, and Fano's inequality, we have
Using the chain rule on both terms on the right hand side,
where (12) and (14) come from the independence of W 2 and W 1 , and (13) comes from the independence of W 2 and (W 1 , Y n 11 ). For the first part in (14), we have
where we refer to (6) . For the second part in (14), we have
where (20) follows from the independence of W 2 and
, we obtain (24) by using the channel model in (6) and the fact that by knowing (Y n 11 , Y n 2 ) = (X n 11 , Y n 2 ), X n 2 can be determined, and finally, we reach (25) by using the channel model in (6) and through the following derivation
Substituting (18) and (25) into (14), we obtain
where ⊕ means bitwise modulo plus. Now, intuitively, as shown in (31), if transmitter 1 intends to transmit n-bit message via X n 11 , then to protect it, transmitter 2 must send Bernoulli ( 1 2 ) i.i.d random noise; however, by performing that, the sub-channel capacity between X n 12 and Y n 12 is constrained and reduced to zero. To confirm this, we continue from (31)
where we repeatedly use the independence of X 
B. Joint Encoding Based Achievable Scheme
Here, we provide an achievable scheme to transmit 3 bits securely by coding across the component channels, i.e., by introducing correlation between the channel inputs of component channels. Let {A, B, C, U, V } be mutually independent Bernoulli ( Fig. 1, where transmitter 1 sends A, V and A ⊕ V in three component channels, respectively (note that we choose X 12 = 0), and transmitter 2 sends U , (B, C) and B ⊕ U in three component channels, respectively.
With this scheme, the legitimate receiver observes A, U, B, C ⊕V, A⊕V ⊕B⊕U from three component channels, which means that the legitimate receiver can decode message A from transmitter 1 and messages B, C from transmitter 2 with zero probability of error, i.e., the legitimate receiver can decode 3 bits reliably. On the other hand, the eavesdropper observes A ⊕ U , B ⊕ V and A ⊕ U ⊕ B ⊕ V , which implies
where we use the independence of {A, B, C, U, V } and also that they are all Bernoulli ( 1 2 ). This derivation implies that the eavesdropper learns nothing about the messages, and therefore, 3 bits are sent to the legitimate receiver reliably and securely.
IV. GAUSSIAN MAC WIRETAP CHANNEL A. General Inseparability
In this section, we show that even the parallel Gaussian MAC wiretap channel is not separable in general. We prove this by providing a specific example. Also note that, it suffices to show the inseparability from the s.d.o.f. point of view, since it implies the inseparability of the secrecy capacity.
Consider the special two-user parallel Gaussian MAC wiretap channel shown in Fig. 2 , in which each component channel is a two-user Gaussian MAC wiretap channel defined by,
where k = a, b, and (h ia , h ib ) and (g ia , g ib ) are the timeinvariant channel gains of user i to the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper, respectively. We let
Then, the six random variables {h 1a , h 2a , g 1a , g 2a , α, β} are mutually independently distributed according to the same continuous distribution, and N 1a , N 2a , N 1b , N 2b are mutually independent Gaussian random variables with zero-mean and unit-variance. The channel inputs of each user satisfy average power constraints, E X 2 ia + X 2 ib ≤ P , for i = 1, 2. From [17] , for almost all channel gains {h 1a , h 2a , g 1a , g 2a }, the sum s.d.o.f. for component channel (a) is On the other hand, by selecting where V and U are independent random variable drawn from the following discrete PAM constellation:
Here, V represents the message-carrying signal and U represents the jamming signal. Let us defineŶ aŝ
The factor in front of V is non-zero for almost all channel gains. Let us defineV as the estimate of V obtained by selecting the closest point in C(a, Q) based on the observation Y . For any small enough δ > 0, let us choose Q = P 1−δ 2 and a = γP δ 2 , where γ is a constant independent of P to meet the average power constraint. Then, due to the Markov chain V → (Y 1a , Y 1b ) →Ŷ →V , we have
≥ log(2Q + 1) − 1 − Pr V =V log(2Q + 1) (55)
Now, due to the PAM structure, probability of error is
where γ , γ are constants independent of P . Then, from (56) and (57), at high SNR (large enough P ), we have
where o(·) is the little-o function.
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On the other hand, for the information leakage rate,
By [13, Theorem 1], we can achieve the sum secrecy rate of
for any δ ≥ 0, which implies that we can achieve 1 sum s.d.o.f. This means that by joint encoding across component channels, we achieve 1 sum s.d.o.f. outperforming optimum independent encoding, which can at most achieve Although the Gaussian MAC wiretap channel is not always separable, the special construction provided in the last subsection is not "general", i.e., for almost all channel gains, the constraints in (47) 
Therefore, it suffices to show that for the overall parallel Gaussian MAC channel the s.d.o.f. region is
The achievability follows from [18] for almost all channel gains. In the achievability, we scale the power in each component channel, to meet the overall power constraint; however, this does not affect the s.d.o.f. calculations.
For the converse, we first flatten the parallel channel by concatenating the channel inputs and outputs of component channels into 2n-length vectors. Instead of studying the parallel channel in n channel uses, we study the flat channel in 2n channel uses. The power constraint remains the same over 2n channel uses. In addition, since introducing correlation in time and in component channels has the same effect, the flat channel must have the same converse as the original one.
Then, similar to the steps in [17, Eqns. (7)- (16)], we have
where vectors in bold-face are 2n-length vectors. The components of 2n-vectorsX j , for j = 1, 2, areX ji = X ji +Ñ ji , for i = 1, . . . , 2n. Here, the sequenceÑ 2n j is i.i.d. over time, is independent of all other random variables, andÑ ji is a Gaussian random variable with zero-mean and variance σ 
Then, all the remaining steps in [17] which completes the proof of the converse for this case.
V. CONCLUSIONS
We showed that the parallel MAC wiretap channel is not always separable by providing a specific example in which the sum secrecy rate by joint encoding over parallel channels outperforms the best rate achievable by individually optimal encoding for each component channel. Then, we showed that the parallel Gaussian MAC wiretap channel is inseparable in general as well. Finally, we showed, from a s.d.o.f. point of view, that the parallel Gaussian MAC wiretap channel is separable almost surely, however, separability in s.d.o.f. is weaker than separability in secrecy capacity.
